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Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000400080084-8

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

KAMPILES, William P.

FROM:

Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

OKC 78-3029/11

DATE

13 SEP 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Legislative Counsel  
Attn: [redacted]

The attached memoranda respond to Section VI - Further Steps being Taken - of the KAMPILES' briefing outline. Included are memoranda dealing with the Security Task Force, Zero Based Review Techniques, General Vogt's review and DDCI memorandum dated 1 September 1978.

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In accordance with your specific request of 18 August 1978, a comprehensive review of the Agency's security policies and procedures has commenced.

During the week of 21 August the organization and staffing of a Security Review Task Force was undertaken. The Task Force will approach the review in three segments. Each segment staff will function under the leadership of a senior experienced officer. The segments will address, separately, Personnel Security, Physical Security, and Information Control and Protection. The magnitude of the task is awesome, and the Director of Security estimates a comprehensive review will require a minimum of sixty (60) days.

The Personnel Security Segment of the Task Force intends to investigate all periods of an employee's career from preemployment processing through post-employment counseling. It is their intent to survey personnel recruitment and assignment policies and procedures which are quite varied from directorate to directorate and from office to office. Although the emphasis in this segment will be on staff employees, the Task Force will also survey the several other types of individuals who are utilized by the Agency. The entire security clearance process from pre-field investigation to final adjudication will be reviewed, as will the vast number of policies and procedures that pertain during the employment phase.

The employment phase topics include security indoctrination/reindoctrination; marriage, including marriage to an alien; outside activities; handling of misconduct incidents; counterintelligence review of high risk personnel and organizational units; the reinvestigation program; security and suitability reviews for overseas candidates; Agency management responsibilities; and the Personnel Evaluation Board. Finally, the Agency's out-processing policies and procedures as well as current policies relative to post-employment counseling will be addressed under this segment.

The Task Force will exclude from its review the operational security policy procedures and practices concerning those individuals who are utilized by the Directorate of

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Operations in an operational and informational capacity such as double agents and clandestine sources. That policy is a DDO responsibility.

The Physical Security Segment has an enormous task at hand. This segment will limit the scope of their review by concentrating primarily upon the physical security program as it is pursued within the Headquarters Building. The substantive areas which constitute the physical security program of the Agency can be examined in relation to operations within the Headquarters Building within a reasonable time frame.

Essentially our physical security policies and procedures at Headquarters have been adopted in our domestic and overseas facilities, and available resource and time constraints dictate that but cursory reference be given to the nature and scope of the overseas and domestic facilities outside Washington during the survey. Similarly, this review will not specifically cover the physical security aspects of our industrial security program because that subject has been thoroughly reviewed during the past year. And finally, we consider the technical threat as well as the measures which have been implemented to counter this threat as beyond the scope of this review.

The Physical Security Segment of the Task Force will address thoroughly the policies and procedures pertaining to: perimeter security; building security; access controls for all types of people from staff employees to vendors; badges; entry and exit inspection procedures; internal personnel control; storage of classified information; the Agency's guard program; intrusion detection systems and other monitoring equipment; after hours security procedures and the security violation program.

The Information Control and Protection Segment proposes to review the application by CIA of directives and regulations governing the production, marking, classification, reproduction, transmission, inventory and overall control of classified information. These will be reviewed for current applicability to determine whether rules are being observed, and, if so, whether a significant measure of control results from their observance. The scope of this segment will include an inquiry into the level and efficiency of employee training in document control procedures; an examination of the possibility

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of handling information at lower levels of classification or compartmentation; exploration of methods to reduce the amount of classified material retained in the Agency; inquiry into the efficacy of current ADP and microform information control, and the state of pre-planning for future information technology requirements. Finally, we intend to examine alternative ways of controlling accountability for classified materials, including automated techniques.

Obviously, to conduct the survey effectively, the Task Force will require the complete cooperation of the Agency's population. For example, to meaningfully describe current procedures under the Personnel Security Segment is going to require close cooperation with several offices, especially the Office of Personnel and the Office of Medical Services. Furthermore, several offices throughout the Agency are involved in the recruitment of personnel, and their cooperation will also be necessary. Consequently, it is recommended that you solicit the cooperation of all directorates with the members of the Task Force.

The Task Force will approach its task by extensive documentary reviews, personal interviews both within and external to the Agency, and by discussion within the Task Force which will lead to a series of recommendations concerning the Agency's security program. The Task Force members have been exhorted to approach the task, particularly the recommendations, with absolute objectivity and personal integrity, as we view the review as an opportunity to assure our security policies and procedures are right for the time.

We envision a final report to be submitted to you by 3 November 1978. We expect that report to be in four parts: (a) a description of current policies and procedures; (b) analysis of current policies and procedures; (c) conclusions; and (d) recommendations.

ZERO BASED REVIEW TECHNIQUES

I have initiated a system of a Zero Based Clearance Review technique to positively assure that cleared personnel actually need the accesses they hold. It demands a positive restatement by management officials of the rationale for each individual clearance held within areas under their jurisdiction. These statements are then reviewed by an impartial arbiter who confirms or denies the requirements with tasking officials as necessary. Our initial reviews utilizing this technique have resulted in significant reductions of access requirements. I envision continuation of this program and expect that it will serve as a vehicle for reducing the number of persons approved for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

SUBJECT: General Vogt's Review

I've recently held discussions on the adequacy of our compartmentation systems with senior officers in the community. We felt that there is a need to take a hard look at the present system with a view toward:

- developing unified management and standards
- simplifying and clarifying our procedures
- downgrading, declassifying and decompartmenting to the maximum extent consistent with the protection of vital sources and methods
- rebuilding security consciousness and restoring the proper implementation of "need to know"
- strengthening the barriers between compartments to avoid "spill-over" from one to another
- better providing for the actual needs of tactical commanders

I've recently asked General John W. Vogt, USAF (Retired) to head a small group of representatives of participating agencies to study this matter and make recommendations, including possibly even coming up with a new and simplified system.